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Abstract: 
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market 
performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using 
a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated 
with improved availability and lower cost of credit to firms. This correlation is stronger for 
opaque firms than transparent ones and stronger in countries with weak legal environments 
than in those with strong legal environments. In cross-sectional estimates, we control for 
variation in country-level aggregate variables that may affect credit, by examining the 
differential impact of information sharing across firm types. In panel estimates, we also 
control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for changes 
in macroeconomic variables and the legal environment. 
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1  Introduction 
When a bank evaluates a request for credit, it can either collect information on the 
applicant first-hand or source this information from other lenders who already dealt with the 
applicant. Information exchange between lenders can occur voluntarily via “private credit 
bureaus” or be enforced by regulation via “public credit registries”, and is arguably an 
important determinant of credit market performance. Theory suggests that information 
sharing may overcome adverse selection in the credit market (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and 
reduce moral hazard, by raising borrowers’ effort to repay loans (Padilla and Pagano, 2000) or 
by avoiding excessive lending when each borrower may patronize several banks (Bennardo, 
Pagano and Piccolo, 2007). While information sharing should improve credit allocation, this 
does not necessarily imply that aggregate credit volume will rise or default ratios will fall. 
Information sharing may change the composition of households and firms which receive 
loans, so that its predicted impact on aggregate credit and credit risk is ambiguous. A proper 
empirical test of the impact of credit bureaus or credit registries should therefore rely on 
information regarding borrower-level credit access.  
Information sharing should be particularly relevant for credit market performance in 
countries with weak company law and creditor rights. Lack of transparency in corporate 
reporting, due to weak company law, increases information asymmetries in the borrower-
lender relationship, reducing incentives for banks to lend. Moreover, weak creditor rights 
make banks more reluctant to lend to risky firms, as contract enforcement is costly or 
impossible. The screening and incentive effects of information sharing can mitigate both of 
these problems. Indeed, recent cross-country data suggests that information sharing may be a 
substitute for better creditor protection in fostering credit market expansion (Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007). In this paper we attempt to shed light on the role of information 
sharing in countries with weak company law and creditor rights. We analyze the impact of 
private credit bureaus and public credit registries on the availability and cost of credit to firms 
in 24 transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
1 Pistor, Raiser and 
                                                 
1 We examine data from 24 transition countries, which we classify into three groups according to their 
status in 2005: European Union (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia); Commonwealth of Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); Other European Countries (Albania, Bosnia &   2
Gelfer (2000) document that in these countries the legal environment is particularly 
unfavorable for lending. Moreover, transition countries are an interesting sample to study 
because some of them have recently experienced both strong credit market development and 
considerable institutional change, including the introduction of information sharing systems. 
Private sector credit has climbed from just 15% of GDP in 1999 to 25% at the end of 2004.
2 
The quality of lending has also strongly improved, with the ratio of non-performing loans in 
banks’ portfolios falling from more than 20% in 1999 to just 10% at the end of 2004. Over the 
same period, seven public registries and seven private credit bureaus have emerged in these 
countries. 
To measure credit market performance, we use firm-level data on credit access and cost of 
credit, drawn from the EBRD/World Bank “Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey” (BEEPS), a representative and large sample of firms. We relate this 
firm-level credit data to country-level indicators of information sharing, compiled from the 
“Doing Business” database of the World Bank/IFC (World Bank, 2006).   
There are two main benefits from investigating the impact of information sharing using our 
data set. First, firm-level data allow us to identify the firms that benefit more from 
information sharing arrangements. For instance, firms that are opaque and costly to screen 
may gain greater access to credit after the introduction of a credit registry or bureau. We can 
thus overcome the limitations of aggregate data, which confound the effect of information 
sharing on individual firms with that arising from compositional changes in the set of firms 
who obtain credit. The second reason for using the BEEPS data is methodological: it allows 
us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, changes in macroeconomic 
variables and changes in the legal environment, using panel data constructed from the 2002 
and 2005 surveys. As far as we are aware, this is the first study to use firm-level panel data to 
investigate the relation between information sharing and credit availability. Previous analyses 
are either based on country-level data (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov et al., 2007) or on 
cross-sectional firm-level data (Galindo and Miller, 2001; Love and Mylenko, 2003).  
Both our cross-sectional estimates and our panel estimates show that on average 
information sharing is associated with more abundant and cheaper credit. In particular, the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro). We exclude the CIS 
countries Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan due to lack of data. 
2 The statistics in this paragraph are unweighted country averages, drawn from the EBRD Transition 
Report (EBRD, 2003; EBRD, 2005).    3
cross-sectional correlation between credit availability and information sharing is stronger for 
opaque firms than transparent ones, where transparency is defined as the reliance on external 
auditors and the adoption of international accounting standards. Moreover, our panel 
estimates suggest that in countries with worse protection of creditor rights information sharing 
improves both credit access and loan contract terms, whereas it does not in countries with 
good creditor protection. Taken together, these two results are consistent with the view that 
information sharing is particularly valuable in settings where the contracting environments is 
unfavorable to lending activity, either because low accounting transparency increase the cost 
of screening potential borrowers or because poor legal protection makes loan contracts hard to 
enforce. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and 
presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and the specification to be 
estimated. Sections 4 and 5 present the results obtained with cross-sectional and panel data, 
respectively. Section 6 summarizes our findings. 
 
2  Effects of Information Sharing 
In this section we review the models proposed in the literature to capture the effects of 
information sharing on credit market performance, using them to draw testable predictions for 
our empirical analysis. We also set our work against the existing empirical evidence in this 
area, to highlight the value added of our contribution. 
 
2.1  Theory 
By exchanging information about their customers, banks can improve their knowledge of 
applicants’ characteristics, past behavior and current debt exposure. In principle, this 
reduction of informational asymmetries can reduce adverse selection problems in lending, as 
well as change borrowers’ incentives to repay, both directly and by changing the 
competitiveness of the credit market. It can also reduce each bank’s uncertainty about the total   4
exposure of the borrower, in the context of multiple-bank lending. The implied effects on 
lending, interest rates and default rates have been modeled in several ways.
3 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that information sharing reduces adverse selection by 
improving bank’s information on credit applicants. In their model, each bank has private 
information about local credit applicants, but no information about non-local applicants. If 
banks exchange information about their client’s credit worthiness, they can assess also the 
quality of non-local credit seekers, and lend to them as safely as they do with local clients. 
The impact of information sharing on aggregate lending in this model is ambiguous. When 
banks exchange information about borrowers’ types, the increase in lending to safe borrowers 
may fail to compensate for an eventual reduction in lending to risky types.  
Information sharing can also create incentives for borrowers to perform in line with banks’ 
interests. Klein (1982) shows that information sharing can motivate borrowers to repay loans, 
when the legal environment makes it difficult for banks to enforce credit contracts. In this 
model borrowers repay their loans because they know that defaulters will be blacklisted, 
reducing external finance in future. Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000) show 
that if banks exchange information on defaults, borrowers are motivated to exert more effort 
in their projects. In both models, default is a signal of bad quality for outside banks and 
carries the penalty of higher interest rates, or no future access to credit.  
Information sharing may also mitigate hold-up problems in lending relationships, which 
arise when banks have or generate private information about firms (Sharpe, 1990; Von 
Thadden, 2004). Credit reports improve the information available to “outside banks”, and thus 
reduce the informational rents that “inside banks” can extract. Padilla and Pagano (1997) 
show that by reducing bank's bargaining power in credit relationships, information sharing 
can elicit higher effort to repay by borrowers, which in turn makes banks willing to lower 
lending rates and extend more credit.
4 However, the increase in competition between banks 
due to information sharing may also reduce credit availability, especially for new businesses. 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that banks with market power are in a better position to 
                                                 
3 See Jappelli and Pagano (2006) for a comprehensive overview of theory and evidence on information 
sharing. 
4 Bouckaert and Degryse (2004) and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) show that if banks compete ex ante 
for clients and customers face switching costs, future informational rents foster banking competition. 
Since information sharing reduces these rents, in these models it reduces competition, in contrast to 
Padilla and Pagano (1997).  
   5
conduct intertemporal cross-subsidization in lending relationships, and are thus more likely to 
lend to risky young firms. The available empirical evidence on the impact of credit market 
competition on credit access for young and small businesses is ambiguous (see e.g. Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995; Zarutskie 2006), suggesting that an increase in competition due to 
information sharing may cut either way.    
Finally, when a customer can borrow from several banks, he may have both the incentive 
and the opportunity to take so much credit as to end up in default: banks may be ready to 
extend additional credit to already indebted people, by charging them high interest rates and 
expecting to recover their money at the expense of other lenders in case of default. Bennardo, 
Pagano and Piccolo (2007) show that this negative contractual externality in the provision of 
credit can induce banks to ration credit, for fear that the customer’s total exposure may 
become so large as to induce default. However, when banks share information about their 
seniority or/and about their loan sizes, lending becomes safer, and the occurrence of credit 
rationing is reduced. Since credit rationing equilibria arise if creditor rights protection is weak 
and borrowers’ future wealth is risky, these are also the circumstances where information 
sharing should be particularly valuable in reducing credit rationing and defaults. 
Given the variety of the informational problems considered in these models, it is not 
surprising that the predicted effects of information sharing on the volume of lending are not 
identical across models. For instance, in the adverse selection model of Pagano and Jappelli 
(1993) the effect on lending is ambiguous, while it is positive in the hold-up model of Padilla 
and Pagano (1997) and in the multiple-bank lending model of Bennardo et al. (2007). The 
effect on lending also depends on the type of information being shared: in the model by 
Padilla and Pagano (2000), sharing only default information increases lending above the level 
reached when banks also share their data about borrowers’ characteristics. Therefore, whether 
information sharing is associated with increased lending is left to the empirical evidence. 
In contrast, these models offer qualitatively similar predictions about the effect of 
information sharing on the probability of default and interest rates: they all predict that, in one 
form or another, communication among banks tends to reduce defaults and thereby 
equilibrium interest rates. But this prediction is unambiguous only if referred to the 
probability of default of an individual borrower. When one considers the average default rate, 
composition effects may overturn the prediction. Suppose that information sharing gives 
lower-grade borrowers access to credit. Even if each borrower’s probability of default is   6
reduced, the aggregate default rate may increase because the relative weight of lower-grade 
borrowers increases in the total pool. This biases the estimates against the models’ prediction 
that information sharing reduces defaults and interest rates. Thus, here is an instance where 
borrower-level data may have an edge over aggregate measures in empirical research. Being 
free of these composition effects, microeconomic data allow a sharper test of this prediction. 
Which firms should benefit more from information sharing between lenders? The stylized 
models discussed so far offer no predictions about how information sharing affects credit 
availability and interest rates depending on borrowers’ characteristics, such as firm size or 
accounting transparency. But such predictions can be generated by considering how these 
characteristics affect the banks’ incentive to rely on information sharing rather than on direct 
screening. If direct screening has fixed costs for banks, one may expect that small firms will 
benefit more from information sharing. Without information sharing, banks would only lend 
to large firms, for whom direct screening is warranted; but with information sharing, banks 
can also offer credit to small firms. A firm’s transparency – as measured for instance by 
reliance on international accounting standards or external auditors – plays a similar role: 
direct screening is more cost-effective when applied to firms with more transparent accounts, 
so that without information sharing these firms are more likely to get credit than opaque ones. 
The introduction of information sharing will enable banks to lend more easily also to opaque 
firms, by relying on non-accounting information from previous creditors.  
The models discussed above also suggest that the impact of information sharing on firm 
credit depends on a country's legal system. Specifically, its impact should be stronger where 
laws do not require accurate financial reporting and auditing (thereby increasing adverse 
selection problems), and creditors rights are poorly protected (thus encouraging borrowers’ 
opportunistic behavior). Indeed many empirical studies confirm that these characteristics of 
the legal system are associated with reduced access to credit (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2007; Levine, 1998; Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco, 2005) and more 
expensive credit (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2004; Laeven and Majnoni, 2005).  
This discussion suggests that, besides investigating the effect of information sharing on the 
availability and cost of credit for a typical firm, our empirical analysis should also examine 
whether and how this effect differs depending on firms’ size, their transparency, and the legal 
environment in which a firm operates.  
    7
2.2  Empirical Evidence 
A growing body of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that information sharing 
enhances credit market performance. Analyses of credit bureau data confirm that credit 
reporting reduces the selection costs of lenders by allowing them to more accurately predict 
individual loan defaults (Barron and Staten, 2003; Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Powell, Miller, 
Mylenko, and Majnoni 2004; Luoto, McIntosh, and Wydick, 2007). Experimental evidence 
by Brown and Zehnder (2007) shows that a public credit registry can motivate borrowers to 
repay loans, when they would otherwise default. 
The impact of information sharing on aggregate credit market performance has been tested 
by two cross-country studies. Based on their own survey of credit reporting in 43 countries, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) show that bank lending to the private sector is larger and default 
rates are lower in countries where information sharing is more solidly established and 
extensive. These cross-sectional relations persist also controlling for other economic and 
institutional determinants of bank lending, such as country size, GDP, growth rate, and 
variables capturing respect for the law and protection of creditor rights. Djankov et al. (2007) 
confirm that private sector credit relative to GDP is positively correlated with information 
sharing in their recent study of credit market performance and institutional arrangements in 
129 countries for the period 1978-2003. 
Firm-level data suggest that information sharing may indeed have a differential impact on 
credit availability for different firm types. Love and Mylenko (2003) combine cross-sectional 
firm-level data from the 1999 World Business Environment Survey with aggregate data on 
private and public registries collected in Miller (2003). They find that private credit bureaus 
are associated with lower perceived financing constraints and a higher share of bank financing 
(while public credit registries are not), and that these correlations are particularly strong for 
small and young firms.
5 Our cross sectional analysis provides additional evidence on the 
differential impact of information sharing by firm type. In particular we show that, in line 
with the above discussion, information sharing benefits opaque firms more than transparent 
ones. But our main contribution is to investigate whether these cross-sectional findings are 
                                                 
5 Galindo and Miller (2001) also provide evidence that information sharing reduces credit constraints 
at firm level. Examining balance sheet data of large companies in 23 countries they find a positive 
relation between credit access and an index of information sharing.    8
confirmed when the estimation is carried out on firm-level panel-data. Cross-sectional 
estimates, such as those by Love and Mylenko (2003), cannot disentangle the effect of 
information sharing from that of unobserved firm-level characteristics and of other country-
level institutional factors. By also relying on panel data, our paper provides the first test that 
controls both for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and for changes in other relevant 
country-level variables. Controlling for the latter is especially important in the context of the 
rapid institutional and economic changes experienced by transition economies.  
 
3  Data 
We draw our data from two main sources. Country level data on information sharing is 
taken from the World Bank / IFC “Doing Business” database. We relate this to firm-level 
information on credit availability taken from the EBRD/World Bank Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). 
 
3.1  Information Sharing  
Between 1991 and 2005 information sharing institutions were established in 17 of the 27 
transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Table 1 provides an 
overview of public credit registries (Panel A) and private credit bureaus (Panel B) in 24 
transition countries at the end of 2005. The main sources of these data are the “Doing 
Business” surveys, conducted by the World Bank/IFC (World Bank, 2006). We complement 
this data with information from our own research.
6 Table 1 shows that public registries 
(PCRs) and private bureaus (PCBs) are much more frequent in EU transition countries than in 
CIS countries.
7 Indeed today all of the eight EU transition countries have an active PCR, 
PCB, or both. In contrast, only three of the nine covered CIS countries have an operating PCR 
                                                 
6 The characteristics of the public credit registry in Kazakhstan were provided to us via questionnaire 
by the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on regulation and 
supervision of financial markets and organizations.
 
7 The CIS countries in our sample are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. We exclude Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan due 
to lack of data.    9
or PCB. The situation is intermediate in other non-EU countries, where in 2004 five out of 
eight feature a PCR, a PCB or both.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In transition countries it is more common to observe either a PCR or a PCB than both of 
them. In Table 1, thirteen countries have either a PCR or a PCB, and only four have both. 
Public registries in transition countries tend to cover larger loans than private bureaus.
8 Panel 
A shows that seven of the twelve public credit registries only cover loans which exceed per 
capita GDP in their country. Further, while all public credit registries cover loans to firms, 
three do not cover loans to private individuals. In contrast, PCBs tend to focus on credit to 
private individuals and cover even smallest loans. Panel B shows that all nine private credit 
bureaus cover loans to private individuals, while four of them do not cover loans to firms. 
Based on Table 1, we construct an information sharing index for each country and year 
between 1996 and 2004. The index measures the presence and structure of public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus on a scale of 1 to 5. It is constructed as the maximum of 
two scores, one for PCRs and one for PCBs.
9 The PCR score adds one point for fulfilling each 
of the following five criteria: (i) both firms and individuals are covered, (ii) positive and 
negative data is collected and distributed, (iii) the registry distributed data which is at least 
two years old, (iv) the threshold for included loans is below per capita GDP, and (v) the 
registry has existed for more than 3 years.
10 The PCB score is computed in a similar way. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 plots the average information index from 1996 to 2004, as well as the PCR and 
PCB scores. The figure highlights that the early years of transition were marked by slow 
                                                 
8 This confirms the findings of Miller (2003) for a predominantly Latin American sample. 
9 Computing the information sharing index as the sum of the two scores (instead of the maximum) 
does not change the qualitative results of the estimation. 
10 Our information sharing index is similar to the “Credit Information Index” reported in the “Doing 
Business” data of the World Bank / IFC, although differently from that index we do not consider the 
right of borrowers to access their credit record.    10
emergence of information sharing institutions, driven by the creation of public registries: prior 
to 2000 only six PCR were set up, while only two private credit bureaus emerged.
11  
Information sharing activity accelerated after 2001, and also private arrangements started to 
appear: five public credit registries and seven private credit bureaus were established. This 
fast development appears set to continue in the coming years, with private credit bureaus 
currently under construction in at least seven more countries.
12 Due to the limited number of 
private credit bureaus in our sample, especially prior to 2000, we do not attempt to compare 
the relative impact of public registries and private bureaus in this paper. 
 
3.2  Credit Access 
We relate our information sharing index to firm-level data on credit access taken from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The EBRD and the 
World Bank conducted this survey jointly in 1999, 2002 and 2005. Our cross-sectional 
analysis is based on data from BEEPS 2002, as this survey version contains the most detailed 
information about firm’s access to credit, and relevant characteristics of firms’ governance 
and management.
13 The BEEPS 2002 provides data on 6153 firms in 26 transition countries 
and covers a representative sample of firms for each of these countries.
14 We drop all 
observations from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, due to lack of institutional indicators for these 
countries. This leaves us with a sample of 5717 firms from 24 countries for our cross-
sectional analysis. Our panel analysis is based on responses of 1333 firms who participated in 
both the 2002 and 2005 surveys. In the following we provide a discussion of the data used in 
our cross-sectional analysis. Information on the panel sample is provided in Section 5. 
For our cross-sectional analysis we use three indicators of firms’ credit access available 
from the BEEPS 2002 survey. Two indicators capture the extent to which access to loans and 
                                                 
11 In 1996 Belarus also introduced a public credit registry. However, the main purpose of this registry 
is to support bank supervision. We therefore do not list it as a public credit registry in our data.  
12 In, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Serbia projects to establish private credit 
bureaus have been initiated, but these were not operating by the end of 2005.  
13 The 2002 survey contains information about a firm's debt-asset ratio as well as the experience of its 
manager. This information is not available from the more recent 2005 survey version.  
14 The survey covers all countries in which the EBRD is operational, with the exception of 
Turkmenistan. See Fries, Lysenko, and Polanec (2003) for a detailed description of the BEEPS 2002 
survey.    11
the cost of credit constrain firm growth, while a third indicator captures firms’ actual use of 
external finance. In two separate questions, firms were asked how problematic the access to 
financing (as determined by collateral requirements and credit availability) and the costs of 
financing (interest rates and charges) are for the operation and growth of their business. We 
code answers to these questions on a scale from 1 to 4 (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate 
obstacle, 3=minor obstacles, 4=no obstacles) and form our dependent variables Access to 
Finance and Cost of Finance.
15 Therefore, higher values of these two variables indicate an 
improvement in the terms at which credit is available: easier access and lower cost. Besides 
looking at how financing conditions affect firm performance, we also analyze firms’ actual 
reliance on external finance. To this purpose, we rely on the variable Firm Debt, which 
measures a firm’s total debt as a percentage of its total assets. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics for the three dependent variables in our cross-sectional analysis by country. 
Definitions and sources of all dependent variables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
3.3  Regression Specification 
We start our empirical analysis with cross-sectional regressions using the BEEPS 2002 
survey data. The baseline specification relates each of our three dependent variables for firm i 
in country j to the information sharing index in the firm’s country, a vector of other country 
characteristics, and a vector of firm characteristics that may affect credit access. Our 
dependent variables were collected during 2002, while information sharing is measured as the 
average value of the index prior to the survey, i.e. 1996-2000. The fact that we relate firm-
level credit indicators to countrywide measures of Information Sharing and that information 
sharing is predetermined with respect to credit variables should address the potential 
endogeneity of information sharing with respect to credit market performance. 
We include five country-level variables to control for differences in the legal environment, 
the structure of the banking sector, and macroeconomic performance: an index of creditor 
                                                 
15 Our coding is opposite to that used in the original BEEPS questionnaire, where 4=major obstacle, 
3=moderate obstacle, 2=minor obstacles, 1=no obstacles. This obviously affects only the sign of our 
coefficient estimates, not their absolute magnitude or precision.   12
rights, an indicator of the ease of contract enforcement, a measure of foreign bank presence, 
per capita GDP, and the inflation rate. Including these variables is particularly important in 
transition countries, where structural and macroeconomic reforms have coincided with the 
emergence of information sharing, and may also have affected credit market performance. 
The Creditor Rights variable is an aggregate measure of creditor legal protection built with 
the methodology proposed by La Porta et al. (1998). Higher values of this index imply that 
secured lenders are better protected in case a borrower defaults.
16 Evidence by Pistor et al. 
(2000) suggests that transition countries with better creditor protection feature higher credit 
market performance. However, they also emphasize that not only the law on the books 
matters for credit market development, but also its actual enforcement. As a measure of actual 
creditor protection, we also include the variable Time to Enforce Payment, which measures 
the (log of the) number of days it takes for a creditor to secure an outstanding payment 
through the courts if a debtor defaults. This variable is taken from the World Bank/IFC 
“Doing Business” database.
17 The Foreign Bank Assets variable  is the share of assets 
controlled by foreign owned banks in each country. Recent evidence suggests that foreign 
bank entry has improved credit market performance in transition countries, reducing 
intermediation spreads (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005) and facilitating credit access 
(Giannetti and Ongena, forthcoming), although the benefits from foreign bank presence 
appear to depend strongly on firm size (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, forthcoming). 
Moreover, foreign bank presence may coincide with information sharing, if these banks are 
familiar with the benefits of credit reports from their home markets, and therefore tend to 
patronize private credit bureaus also in their host countries. Finally, we include two controls 
for country-specific macroeconomic performance (log Per Capita GDP and Inflation), as 
previous evidence suggests that macroeconomic stabilization is associated with an expansion 
in financial intermediation in transition countries (Fries and Taci, 2002).
18 
                                                 
16 We draw yearly measures of this creditor rights index for our sample for the years 1996-2003 from 
Djankov et al. (2007). In the cross-sectional estimation, we use the 1996-2000 average of this index. 
For Estonia we use the 1998 value taken from Pistor et al. (2000).  
17 As the variable Contract Enforcement is taken from the Doing Business database it is available from 
2003-2007 only, in the cross-sectional analysis we take the 2005 indicator. 
18 For both macroeconomic variables we take the 2000 values to avoid using the extraordinary 
macroeconomic data from the 1998 and 1999 period in which the Russian crisis took place.   13
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our country-level explanatory variables, including 
the information sharing index. Definitions and sources of all control variables are provided in 
the Appendix. The table documents strong variation in institutional and macroeconomic 
indicators. For example, the creditor rights index ranges from 1 for Hungary and Poland to 3 
in Croatia and the Czech Republic. Loan contract enforcement requires roughly 150 days in 
Lithuania and Estonia, while it takes over 900 days in Poland and Slovenia. Macroeconomic 
conditions also range from low inflation (below 2% in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, 
and Lithuania) to hyperinflation (above 100% in Belarus). Most countries with developed 
information sharing systems (e.g. Czech Republic and Estonia) also display relatively high 
levels of institutional reform and macroeconomic stability. This confirms the importance of 
controlling for these country-level variables, in order to identify the specific role of 
information sharing. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
We include seven firm-level explanatory variables to control for the variation in credit risk 
and financing requirements across firms. It is customary to regard larger firms as less risky, 
other things equal. We distinguish small firms from large ones by their number of employees 
(Small Firm = 1−49, Large Firm ≥ 50). It is also customary to regard younger firms as more 
risky than older firms. However, in transition countries firm age also determines the economic 
regime under which the firm emerged. Thus, while older firms may be less risky in general, 
they may be riskier in transition countries, because they emerged during the pre-transition or 
transition phase. Rather than controlling simply for firm age, we therefore distinguish firms 
by three categories depending on whether they were established before 1989 (Pre-transition 
Firm), between 1989 and 1993 (Transition Firm), after 1993 (Post-transition Firm).
19 
We further include two control variables for firm ownership. State-owned Firm is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the government holds a majority stake in the firm. The 
effect of this variable is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, state ownership may reduce 
firm risk in the eye of a bank, due to the possible government bailout in case of default. On 
the other, state ownership may increase default risk, owing to the political pressures on 
                                                 
19 Including age rather than our three categorical variables does not alter our results.   14
management to diverge from profit-maximizing policies. Moreover, these firms may receive 
public funding, which reduces their reliance on credit for investment and therefore relieves 
their credit constraint to firm growth. The dummy variable Privatized Firm equals one for 
private firms which emerged as the result of a privatization process, and zero for all de-novo 
private firms. A successfully privatized firm may be less risky than a de-novo firm, and 
therefore may have enhanced credit access. Furthermore, they may still have ties to the public 
sector that make them less dependent on bank finance. 
Given the weak legal environment and lack of transparency in corporate governance, 
borrower-lender relationships in transition countries are likely to suffer from severe adverse 
selection and moral hazard. As a consequence banks’ lending decisions might also be affected 
by firm characteristics that improve the transparency of their activities. We capture firm 
transparency by a composite indicator of a firm’s book-keeping and auditing procedures. The 
variable  Transparency  takes the value 0 if a firm does not use international accounting 
standards or external auditors. The variable takes the value 1 if a firm has either international 
accounting standards or an external auditor; while it takes the value 2 if both apply. Of course, 
in general transparency is determined by regulatory standards as well as by firms’ choices, 
and therefore cannot be regarded as an entirely exogenous firm characteristic. For this reason, 
we shall also control for the potential endogeneity of firm-level transparency using 
instrumental variables estimation.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
In all our regressions we include sector dummies, to control for different finance needs of 
firms. Table 4 provides summary statistics for our firm-level explanatory variables. 
Definitions and sources of all control variables are again provided in the Appendix. The table 
shows that our sample is dominated by small firms (67%). Exactly half of the firms were 
established after 1993, and are thus categorized as post-transition firms, while a further 28% 
were established in the transition phase of 1989-1993. The majority of firms are privately 
owned, with only a minor share state-owned (14%). Of the 86% privately owned firms in the 
sample, 83% are de-novo firms, implying that a total of 14% of our firms are privatized 
companies. Our sample displays a low level of transparency on average. 
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4  Cross-sectional Estimates 
Tables 5 to 7 report cross-sectional estimation results for our three dependent variables 
based on the BEEPS 2002 survey. Table 5 reports results for OLS regressions whose 
dependent variable is Access to Finance. In all four estimated models we regress credit access 
on our information sharing index, controlling for firm characteristics and country-level 
indicators of institutional and macroeconomic reform. Column 1 presents our baseline 
specification. Columns 2 to 4 report the estimates for specifications that allow for a 
differential impact of information sharing across firms, by including interaction effects of 
Information Sharing with firm-level and country-level characteristics.
20 In all specifications, 
the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for cluster effects at the country 
level.
21 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 The positive coefficient of Information Sharing in all four columns of Table 5 suggests 
that, on average, credit access is less of a constraint on firm growth in countries where public 
credit registries or private credit bureaus are more developed.
22 The relevant coefficient 
estimates are not only statistically significant but also economically sizeable: for instance, the 
coefficient estimated in column 1 suggests that  raising the information sharing index from the 
lowest (0) to the highest observed value (4.6) raises the credit access indicator by 0.41, which 
is about 24% of the sample mean (1.69).  
                                                 
20 Qualitatively similar results are obtained with ordered probit estimation. We present OLS estimates because 
this makes it easier to compare the results to those of our panel analysis, and facilitates the interpretation of the 
coefficients of the interaction effects on columns 2-4. See Ai and Norton (2003) for a discussion of the problems 
in  interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models. 
21 Note that inference with cluster-robust standard errors is based on the assumption that the number of 
clusters is large, and that with a small number of clusters, cluster-robust standard errors are downward 
biased. In our analysis we have 24 clusters only, so that the standard STATA procedure to compute 
robust standard errors may be subject to such a bias. Therefore we performed robustness checks in 
which we bootstrapped standard errors as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2007). Results 
for these checks show that bootstrapped errors are indeed larger, but the significance of our main 
results for information sharing is confirmed. 
22  Non-reported regressions suggest that the impact of information sharing through public credit 
registers or private credit bureaus alone are similar in magnitude and significance.   16
The results in Table 5 further show that that larger firms perceive credit access as less of a 
growth constraint. The same applies to firms that were established in the post-transition phase 
and to more transparent firms. To give an idea of the economic impact of a change in firm-
level transparency, consider that a firm with external auditors and international accounting 
standards has a credit access indicator that is about 10% higher than the sample mean.
23 As 
for country-level explanatory variables, we find that perceived credit constraints are lower in 
countries with higher per-capita GDP, lower inflation, stronger creditor protection and less 
foreign bank presence. 
The results suggest that opaque firms benefit more from information sharing than 
transparent firms. In column 2 we introduce the interaction effect Information Sharing × 
Opaque Firm, whereby Opaque Firm is a dummy variable which is only 1 for firms who do 
not use international accounting standards and have no external auditor. The estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. This 
finding supports our conjecture that lenders find information sharing more valuable for firms 
where accounting information is poorer, and therefore adverse selection and incentive 
problems would otherwise be more severe.  
In column 3 of the table we introduce the interaction term Information Sharing × Small 
Firm to capture differences in the impact of information sharing across firm sizes. If banks 
have fixed costs of screening clients, small firms should benefit more from information 
sharing than large ones. While we do find that the coefficient of this interaction term is 
positive, this result is not statistically significant. 
One reason for the substantial impact of information sharing in transition economies may 
be the weak legal and institutional environment that makes it costly for banks to screen loan 
applicants and enforce credit contracts. In the final column of Table 5 we test this conjecture 
by exploiting cross-country variation in the institutional environment. We introduce an 
                                                 
23 In the regressions reported in Table 5 we treat the degree of financial transparency as exogenous. 
However, it is conceivable that firms alter their accounting and auditing procedures in order to 
improve their access to credit. In order to control for the endogeneity of firm transparency, we 
estimate instrumental variable regressions. As instruments for firm transparency, we use the age and 
education of the firm’s manager, as well as the type of major shareholder of the firm, which all have 
significant predictive power for transparency. The results of these IV estimates confirm the positive 
and highly significant impact of Information Sharing and also yield coefficients of Transparency that 
are higher than those reported in Table 5. Similar IV regressions confirm the findings obtained in 
Table 6 for Cost of Finance and in Table 7 for Firm Debt.   17
interaction term Information Sharing × Weak Creditor Rights, whereby countries are 
classified as featuring “weak creditor rights” if their score on the 0-4 creditor rights index 
does not exceed 2.
24 The positive coefficient of the interaction term suggests that the impact 
of information sharing on credit access may be higher in countries with weak creditor 
protection. However, again this coefficient is imprecisely estimated. 
Table 6 reports OLS estimation results when the Cost of Finance indicator is the dependent 
variable using the same model specifications as the previous table. The estimates generally 
parallel those of Table 5. The positive and significant coefficient of Information Sharing in all 
four columns suggests that, on average, the cost of credit is lower in countries where 
information sharing is more developed, consistently with the predictions discussed in Section 
2. Also in line with our previous results, we find that more transparent firms, larger firms and 
post-transition firms view credit cost as a lower constraint on their operations. However, the 
coefficients of Transparency and Post-transition Firm are imprecisely estimated. The cost of 
credit tends to be lower in countries with greater per-capita GDP and lower inflation. As in 
Table 5, the interaction term Information Sharing × Opaque Firm has a positive coefficient, 
but here it is less precisely estimated. The results for the interaction terms of information 
sharing with firm size and weak creditor rights are again insignificant. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Table 7 reports estimates of Tobit regressions where the dependent variable is Firm Debt, 
as a fraction of total assets. The estimated coefficients in column 1 confirm only some of our 
previous findings for Access to Finance and Cost of Finance. Other things equal, leverage is 
positively associated with financial transparency, firm size and creditor rights. But in contrast 
to the findings of Tables 5 and 6, the coefficient of Information Sharing is not significant in 
the baseline specification, while the coefficients of its interactions with Small Firm and Weak 
Creditor Rights are positive and significant. These results provide some evidence for the 
conjectures that the benefits of information sharing should be stronger for small firms and in 
countries with weak creditor protection. 
 
                                                 
24 According to this classification the following countries have weak creditor rights: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine.   18
 [Table 7 here] 
 
5  Panel Estimates 
The cross-sectional results reported so far may be biased due to omitted country-level and 
firm-level variables. To tackle these issues, we repeat our analysis using a panel generated 
from the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS. Of the total 9655 firms covered by the BEEPS 2005, 1457 
were also surveyed in 2002. Due to our exclusion of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the 
absence of firms from Bosnia in the panel, our data set shrinks to 1333 firms from 23 
countries.  
As the BEEPS 2005 does not contain information on firm’s external debt, our panel 
estimates are limited to the dependent variables Access to Finance and Cost of Finance. For 
both variables we perform fixed-effect estimation, regressing the change in the reported credit 
constraint per firm on changes in firm characteristics (Small Firm, Transparency) and in time-
varying country-level indicators (Information Sharing,  Per Capita GDP,  Foreign Bank 
Assets, Creditor Rights) between 2002 and 2005. Time invariant variables are not included. 
Although our panel data set includes two dates only, there is substantial variation in the 
information sharing index, which varies for 14 of our 23 countries. Tables 8 and 9 report the 
firm-level fixed-effects estimates for Access to Finance and Cost of Finance respectively. The 
specifications reported in columns 1 through 4 replicate those in our cross-sectional analysis, 
except for the exclusion of regressors that do not change over time.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
The results displayed in Table 8 confirm our cross-sectional findings about the association 
between information sharing and credit access. The coefficient of Information Sharing is 
positive and significant in columns 1 through 3, and it is similar in size to that of our cross-
sectional estimates, even though the sample is smaller and we control for firm-level effects. 
Also the coefficient of Creditor Rights is positive and statistically different from zero, as in 
Table 5. Moreover, these two variables appear to substitute for each other in their effect on 
credit access: in column 4 their interaction effect has a positive coefficient, while the estimate 
for the coefficient of Information Sharing itself is close to zero. This result suggests that   19
information sharing enhances credit access in countries with weak creditor protection, while it 
has no noticeable effect in countries with stronger creditor protection. This evidence 
corroborates the conjecture of Djankov et al. (2007) that information sharing and creditor 
rights are substitutes in fostering credit market development. Instead, the panel estimates do 
not confirm our cross-sectional finding that the impact of information sharing differs by firms 
transparency.  
Table 9 repeats the panel fixed-effect estimation for the Cost of Finance. The estimates 
closely resemble those in Table 8. We find that in countries where information sharing has 
been enhanced, the cost of credit has reportedly become less of a constraint for firms’ 
operations: the coefficient of Information Sharing is positive, significant (in columns 1 and 2) 
and similar in size to its cross-sectional estimate. The positive effect of information sharing is 
similar for opaque and transparent firms, as well as for small and large firms. The final 
column of Table 9 confirms that the impact of information sharing on firm credit hinges upon 
the surrounding legal environment: the coefficient of Information Sharing itself is again 
insignificant, while the coefficient of its interaction term with Weak Creditor Rights is 
positive and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
The coefficients for other firm-level variables (Transparency, Small Firm) and country-
level variables (Per Capita GDP, Inflation, Foreign Bank Assets) in Tables 8 and 9 are less 
precisely estimated than in our cross-sectional analysis (see Tables 5 and 6). This finding 
suggests that relevant cross-sectional variation in credit access is being absorbed by the firm-
fixed effects in our panel analysis. This conjecture is supported by the results of a regression 
in which we replicate the baseline specification of column 1 omitting firm fixed-effects. In 
these cross-sectional stacked regressions we obtain results that closely parallel the cross-
sectional analysis. 
Finally, the panel estimates reported in Tables 8 and 9 could be biased if the characteristics 
of the firms covered in our panel differ from those of the full sample surveyed in the BEEPS 
2002. Indeed, in 2002 the firms present in our panel report on average lower credit constraints 
(along both the access and the cost dimension) and were more transparent than firms 
interviewed in 2002 but not included in the panel. However, while statistically significant, the   20
differences between panel and non-panel firms from the 2002 survey are marginal in size.
25 
The panel results reported below are therefore hardly biased by sample selection effects.  
 
6  Conclusions 
The transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are a unique 
environment to test the effects of institutions on credit market performance, since recently 
they have featured wide variation in institutions both across countries and over time. In this 
paper we investigate the effects of the variation in one such institution, that is, the information 
sharing arrangement among banks between 1996 and 2004, using a large sample of firm-level 
data. The effects of information sharing arrangements are of particular interest in the context 
of transition countries because they may mitigate the effects of the weak protection afforded 
to creditors in most of these jurisdictions. 
The use of firm-level data allows us to test theoretical predictions without the biases that 
composition effects might introduce in tests conducted on aggregate data and to check these 
predictions by splitting the sample by firm characteristics. Our reliance on firm-level data 
allows us to achieve also a substantial methodological improvement over previous empirical 
studies: we control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, and purge 
the estimated correlation between information sharing and credit market performance from 
the effects of variation in firm-level characteristics and country-level institutional and 
macroeconomic variables.  
Our cross-sectional and panel estimates show that information sharing is associated with 
improved availability and lower cost of credit, particularly in transition countries with weak 
creditor protection. Our cross-sectional estimates suggest that information sharing and firm-
level accounting transparency are substitutes in enhancing credit availability: the correlation 
between information sharing and credit access (or the cost of credit) is stronger for opaque 
                                                 
25 In our panel of 1333 firms, on average the indicator of credit “access” is 1.73, that of credit “cost” is 
1.53, and that of “transparency” is .96 (see the appendix for the definitions of these variables). The 
corresponding average indicators for the 4384 non-panel firms in the 2002 survey are 1.68, 1.45, and 
.83 respectively. A t-test confirms that the difference between panel and non-panel firms is statistically 
significant for “access” at the 10% level, for “cost” at the 5% level and for “transparency” at the 1% 
level.    21
firms than for transparent ones. Our panel estimates suggest that information sharing also 
plays a substitute role with respect to the protection of creditor rights: its impact on credit 
access and cost is present for firms located in countries with poor creditor protection, but not 
for those where creditor rights are already well protected by the law.  
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Appendix. Definition of variables 
 
 
1. Firm-level variables (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey - BEEPS) 
 
 
Cross sectional analysis (BEEPS 2002): The cross sectional analysis is based on responses by 5717 
firms in 24 transition countries to the BEEPS 2002 questionnaire. By design this data set provides a 
similar sample of non-agricultural firms across all countries. The sample is dominated by small firms 
(67%) and private firms (86%). The sample includes firms from service and manufacturing sectors, 
with the majority of firms (54%) have their main activity in the service sector. All firms in the sample 
are at least 3 years old. 
 
Panel Analysis (BEEPS 2002 & 2005): The panel analysis is based on responses by 1333 firms 
interviewed in both the BEEPS 2002 and 2005 surveys. This represents 14% of the 9655 firms 
covered by the BEEPS 2005 survey. The sample structure for the 2005 survey resembles by design 
that of the 2002 survey. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Access to Finance. Definition: Answer to the following question: “Can you tell me how problematic 
is access to finance (e.g. collateral requirement) or financing not available from banks for the 
operation and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 
4=no obstacle). Source: q80a. 
 
Cost of Finance. Definition: Answer to the following question: “How problematic is cost of financing 
(e.g. interest rates and charges) for the operation and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 
2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Source: q80b. 
  
Firm Debt. Definition: Ratio of total debt to total assets. Source: q84a1. Only available in the BEEPS 
2002. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Small Firm. Definition: Dummy Variable if total number of full-time employees less then 50. Source: 
s4a2. 
 
Transition Firm. Definition: Firm was established in the years 1989-1993. Source: s1a. 
 
Post-transition Firm. Definition: Firm was established after 1993. Source: s1a. 
 
State-owned Firm. Definition: State controlled firm (yes/no). Source: s2b. 
 
Privatized Firm. Definition: privatized firm (yes/no). Source: q9aa. 
  
Transparency.  Based on use of international accounting standards (source: q73) and of external 
auditor (source: q74). Transparency equals 0 if the firm does not use international accounting 
standards or external auditors, 1 if it uses of the two, 2 if it uses both. 
  
Sector: Definition: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing transport and communication, Wholesale, 
retail and repairs, Real estate, renting and business service, Hotels and restaurants, Others. Source: q2.  
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2. Country-level explanatory variables 
 
 
Information Sharing. For each year between 1996 and 2004 we compute an index for private credit 
bureaus and one for public credit registers: 1 point if it exists for more than 3 years; 1 point if 
individuals and firms are covered; 1 point if positive and negative data are collected; 1 point if 
PCR/PCB distributes data which is at least 2 years old; 1 point if threshold loan is below per capita 
GDP. We then take the maximum of the index for credit bureaus and public credit registers. We use 
1996-2000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 2001-03 value for the 2005 BEEPS. Our main data source 
is the Doing Business in 2006 report (World Bank, 2006). Additional data on Belarus and Kazakhstan 
are based on the authors’ own research.  
 
Creditor Rights. We use the index of creditor rights  based on methodology of La Porta et al. (1998). 
A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws 
and regulations. First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a 
debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the 
reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm. Fourth, if management does not retain administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization. We use 1996-2000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 
2001-03 value for the 2005 BEEPS. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). For Estonia, we rely on the figure 
for 1998 reported by Pistor et al. (2000). 
 
Time to Enforce Payment. Definition: The time taken to resolve a dispute in which a debtor defaults 
on a payment equal to 50% of a country’s per capita GDP. The indicator measures the (log of the) 
number of days from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until the moment of actual 
payment. We use 2005 value for both surveys, because earlier values are not available. Source: World 
Bank (2006). 
 
Foreign Bank Assets. Definition: The share of banking sector assets controlled by banks with a 
majority (at least 50%) foreign ownership. We use 1996-2000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 2001-
03 value for the 2005 BEEPS. Source: EBRD transition report (EBRD, 2003; EBRD, 2005; EBRD, 
2006).  
 
Per Capita GDP. Definition: Log of per capita GDP in thousands of U.S. dollars. We use 1996-2000 
values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 2001-03 value for the 2005 BEEPS. Source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS): line 99b, line ae, line 99z. 
 
Inflation. Definition: average annual growth rate of CPI. We use 1996-2000 values for the 2002 
BEEPS, and 2001-03 value for the 2005 BEEPS. Source: IFS (line 64), EBRD transition report 
(EBRD, 2003; EBRD, 2005).   27
 
Figure 1 
Information Sharing in Transition countries over Time 
 
Values reported in the figure are unweighted averages of the Information Sharing index and the PCR 
and PCB scores for the 24 transition countries listed in Table 1. In each country/year, the information 
sharing index is the maximum of the corresponding PCB and PCR scores. 
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Table 1. Panel A: Public Credit Registries in Transition Countries 
 
Start of Operations is the year in which the public credit registry (PCR) started distributing credit 
records. Individuals Covered is 1 if the PCR covers private individuals, and 0 otherwise. Firms 
Covered is 1 if the PCR covers firms, and 0 otherwise. Negative Information is 1 if the PCR collects 
and distributes negative information, and 0 otherwise. Positive Information is 1 if the PCR collects and 
distributes positive information, and 0 otherwise. Threshold is the minimum loan size covered by the 
PCR as percentage of GDP per capita. History is 1 if credit reports provide information for more than 
the most recent 2 years, and 0 otherwise. Source: Doing Business in 2006 (World Bank, 2006); 
National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
 
 
  Start of 
Operations 
 
Individuals 
Covered 
Firms 
Covered 
Negative 
Information 
Positive 
Information 
Threshold History 
Albania              
Armenia 2003  x  x  x  x  240   
Azerbaijan 2005  x  x  x  x  107  x 
Belarus              
Bosnia              
Bulgaria 1999  x  x  x  x  208   
Croatia              
Czech Rep.  2002    x  x  x  0  x 
Estonia              
Georgia                
Hungary              
Kazakhstan 1996  x x  x  x 140  x 
Kyrgyz Rep.               
Latvia   2003  x  x  x    0  x 
Lithuania 1995  x  x  x x  86  x 
Macedonia   1998  x  x  x  x  118  x 
Moldova              
Poland              
Romania   2000  x  x  x  x  187  x 
Russia              
Serbia 2002  x  x    x  2995   
Slovak Rep.  1997    x  x  x  0   
Slovenia 1994    x  x  x  0  x 
Ukraine              
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Table 1. Panel B: Private Credit Bureaus in Transition Countries 
 
Start of Operations is the year in which the private credit bureau (PCB) started distributing credit 
records. Individuals Covered is 1 if the PCB covers private individuals, and 0 otherwise. Firms 
Covered is 1 if the PCB covers firms, and 0 otherwise. Negative Information is 1 if the PCB collects 
and distributes negative information, and 0 otherwise. Positive Information is 1 if the PCB collects and 
distributes positive information, and 0 otherwise. Threshold is the minimum loan size covered by the 
PCB as percentage of GDP per capita. History is 1 if credit reports provide information for more than 
the most recent 2 years, and 0 otherwise. Source: Doing Business in 2006 (World Bank, 2006).. Two 
stars indicate that a private credit bureau is under construction. 
 
 
  Start of 
operations 
 
Individuals 
covered 
Firms 
covered 
Negative 
information 
Positive 
information 
Threshold History 
Albania             
Armenia  **           
Azerbaijan             
Belarus             
Bosnia 2001  x  X  x  x  0  x 
Bulgaria **             
Croatia **             
Czech Rep.  2002  x  X  x  x  0  x 
Estonia 1993  x  X  x    1  x 
Georgia                
Hungary 1995  x  X  x  x  0  x 
Kazakhstan **            
Kyrgyz Rep.  2003  x    x  x  0  x 
Latvia                
Lithuania 2004  x  X  x    0   
Macedonia                
Moldova              
Poland 2001  x    x  x  0  x 
Romania   2004  x    x    0  x 
Russia **             
Serbia **             
Slovak Rep.  2004  x    x  x  0  x 
Slovenia             
Ukraine              
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Table 2. Access to Credit, Cost of Credit and Ratio of Debt to Total Assets. 
Sample Means 
 
Access to Credit is the answer to the question: “How problematic is access to finance for the operation 
and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no 
obstacle). Cost of Credit is the answer to the question: “How problematic is the cost of finance (e.g. 
interest rates and charges) for the operation and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 
2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Firm Debt is debt as a percentage of total 
assets in 2001. Source: BEEPS 2002. 
 
Country  Access to Finance 
 
Cost of Finance  Firm Debt  Observations 
Albania 1.93  1.41  19.84  170 
Armenia 1.66  1.48  4.23  171 
Azerbaijan 1.84  1.80  3.45  170 
Belarus 1.53  1.22  7.94  250 
Bosnia 1.48  1.21  12.95  182 
Bulgaria 1.20  1.12  12.87  250 
Croatia 1.82  1.73  14.75  187 
Czech Rep.  1.55 1.47  8.37 268 
Estonia 2.06  1.99  14.77  170 
Georgia   1.79  1.47  6.76  174 
Hungary 1.78  1.69  9.82  250 
Kazakhstan 2.00  1.84 7.64  250 
Kyrgyz Rep.  1.76  1.60  12.26  173 
Latvia   2.15  1.99  10.33  176 
Lithuania 2.38  2.01  13.60  200 
Macedonia   1.92 1.62  6.45 170 
Moldova 1.51  1.05  6.84  174 
Poland 1.35  0.83  7.76  500 
Romania   1.45  1.20  10.86  255 
Russia 1.69  1.76  5.03  506 
Serbia 1.57  1.22  10.59  250 
Slovak Rep.  1.50  1.42  15.35  170 
Slovenia 2.18  1.80  12.95  188 
Ukraine 1.56  1.38  4.53  463 
        
Total 1.69  1.47  9.31  5717 
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Table 3. Country-Level Explanatory Variables.  
Sample Means 
 
The table reports the country-level explanatory variables used in the cross-sectional analysis. See the 
appendix for a detailed description of the variables. For ease of interpretation, the variable Time to 
Enforce Payment shown in this table is the actual number of days rather than the log of this indicator 
used in our regression analysis. Likewise, we display per capita GDP in thousands of U.S. dollars, 
rather than the log of this figure used in the regressions. 
 
Country  Information 
Sharing 
(1-5) 
 
Creditor 
Rights 
 
(0-4) 
Time to 
Enforce 
Payment 
(days) 
Foreign 
Bank Assets 
(%) 
Per Capita 
GDP 
(1'000 $) 
Inflation 
 
(%) 
Albania 0  3  390  27.1  1.2  0.1 
Armenia 0  2  185  44.9  0.6  -0.8 
Azerbaijan 0  3  267  4.4  0.6  1.8 
Belarus 0  2  225  3.6  0.8  168.6 
Bosnia 0  3  330  12.7  1.2  1.9 
Bulgaria 0.8  1.5  440  59.1  1.6  10.3 
Croatia 0  3  415  62.2  4.2  5.3 
Czech Rep  0  3  290 51.9  5.5 3.9 
Estonia 4  3  150  93.6  4.0  4.0 
Georgia 0  2  375  16.8  0.7  4.1 
Hungary 3.8  1  365  64.5  4.5  9.8 
Kazakhstan 3.6  3  380 19.8  1.2  18.7 
Kyrgyzstan 0  3  492  20.6  0.3  13.2 
Latvia 0  3  186  74.2  3.2  2.7 
Lithuania 4.6  2  154  45.9  3.3  1.0 
Macedonia 2  3  509 32.5  1.8 6.6 
Moldova 0  2  340  37.1  0.3  31.3 
Poland 0  1  980  61.0  4.5  10.1 
Romania 0.6  2  335  45.2  1.4  45.7 
Russia 0  1  330  10.1  1.8  20.8 
Serbia 0  3  635  0.5  1.0  8.8 
Slovak Rep  1.2  2  565  33.4  3.7  60.4 
Slovenia 2.8  2  913  10.1  9.5  12.0 
Ukraine 0  2  269  10.8  0.6  28.2 
            
Total 0.9  2.1  418  33.9  2.42  21.0 
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Table 4. Firm-level Control Variables. 
Sample Means 
 
The table reports the country averages of the firm-level control variables used in the cross-sectional 
analysis. See the appendix for a detailed description of the variables. 
 
 
Country Small  Firm  Transition 
Firm  
Post-
transition 
Firm 
State-owned 
Firm 
Privatized 
Firm 
Transparency 
Albania 0.71  0.17  0.75  0.08  0.11  1.41 
Armenia 0.73 0.09 0.46 0.33 0.18 0.81 
Azerbaijan 0.69  0.13  0.69  0.14  0.15  0.73 
Belarus 0.69  0.30  0.52  0.05  0.18  0.68 
Bosnia 0.60  0.10  0.56  0.23  0.13  1.05 
Bulgaria 0.69 0.29 0.40 0.16 0.15 0.90 
Croatia 0.67  0.36  0.37  0.13  0.15  1.03 
Czech Rep  0.66  0.51  0.38 0.10 0.13 0.57 
Estonia 0.71  0.34  0.58  0.09  0.14  1.71 
Georgia 0.75  0.09  0.66  0.20  0.16  1.32 
Hungary 0.67 0.42 0.33 0.18 0.05 0.90 
Kazakhstan 0.70  0.24  0.62 0.18 0.15 0.86 
Kyrgyzstan 0.62  0.17  0.58  0.24  0.16  0.78 
Latvia 0.70  0.27  0.59  0.11  0.17  1.20 
Lithuania 0.67  0.29  0.54  0.17  0.16  0.97 
Macedonia 0.70  0.28  0.48 0.14 0.04 0.49 
Moldova 0.68 0.16 0.68 0.20 0.16 1.26 
Poland 0.66  0.32  0.33  0.09  0.14  0.72 
Romania 0.60 0.40 0.46 0.13 0.15 0.66 
Russia 0.67  0.23  0.59  0.15  0.13  0.53 
Serbia 0.61  0.31  0.35  0.10  0.17  0.59 
Slovak Rep  0.64  0.42  0.41  0.12  0.15  0.67 
Slovenia 0.77 0.43 0.29 0.20 0.09 0.80 
Ukraine 0.67  0.23  0.57  0.11  0.14  1.03 
        
Total 0.67  0.28  0.50  0.14  0.14  0.86 
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Table 5. Access to Finance 
 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions whose dependent variable is Access to Finance, 
defined as the answer to the question: “How problematic is access to finance for the operation and 
growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). 
Each regression includes sector dummies. Opaque Firm is a dummy variable which is 1 only for firms 
that do not have external auditors or international accounting standards. Weak Creditor Rights is a 
dummy variable which is 1 only for firms in countries where the value of the Creditor Right Index is 
less than or equal to 2. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for 
cluster effects at the country level. One star indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Information Sharing  0.090***  0.065**  0.086***  0.075** 
 (3.68)  (2.25)  (3.47)  (2.77) 
Transition Firm  0.076  0.079  0.075  0.076 
 (1.22)  (1.30)  (1.20)  (1.23) 
Post-transition Firm  0.163***  0.165***  0.162***  0.165*** 
 (3.22)  (3.25)  (3.21)  (3.29) 
Small Firm  -0.155***  -0.152***  -0.145***  -0.155*** 
 (4.78)  (4.64)  (4.35)  (4.81) 
Privatized Firm  0.084  0.083  0.084  0.084 
 (1.23)  (1.22)  (1.22)  (1.24) 
State-owned Firm  0.105  0.110  0.105  0.106 
 (1.52)  (1.63)  (1.53)  (1.54) 
Transparency 0.134***  0.166***  0.134***  0.134*** 
 (4.86)  (5.64)  (4.92)  (4.88) 
Per Capita GDP (Log)  0.113*  0.117*  0.113*  0.106* 
 (1.92)  (1.95)  (1.92)  (1.81) 
Inflation -0.165**  -0.163**  -0.165**  -0.159** 
 (2.55)  (2.46)  (2.55)  (2.37) 
Foreign Bank Assets  -0.005***  -0.005**  -0.005***  -0.005** 
 (2.85)  (2.76)  (2.85)  (2.62) 
Creditor Rights  0.082*  0.080*  0.082*  0.095* 
 (1.96)  (1.92)  (1.97)  (1.86) 
Time to Enforce Payment (Log)  -0.168**  -0.178**  -0.167**  -0.160* 
 (2.17)  (2.30)  (2.16)  (2.05) 
Information Sharing × Opaque Firm   0.076***     
   (2.99)     
Information Sharing × Small Firm     0.011   
     (0.63)   
Information Sharing × Weak Creditor Rights       0.026 
       (0.95) 
Constant 2.340***  2.370***  2.333***  2.262*** 
 (4.81)  (4.84)  (4.78)  (4.35) 
        
Observations 5392  5392  5392  5392 
R-squared 0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
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Table 6. Cost of Finance 
 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions whose dependent variable is Cost of Finance, defined 
as the answer to the question: “How problematic is cost of financing (e.g. interest rates and charges) 
for the operation and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor 
obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Each regression includes sector dummies. Opaque Firm is a dummy variable 
which is 1 only for firms that do not have external auditors or international accounting standards. 
Weak Creditor Rights is a dummy variable which is 1 only for firms in countries where the value of 
the Creditor Right Index is less than or equal to 2. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. One star indicates that the 
estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 
1%. 
 
 
   (1) 
 
 (2)   (3)   (4) 
Information Sharing  0.079**  0.067**  0.079**  0.095*** 
 (2.73)  (2.28)  (2.59)  (3.19) 
Transition Firm  0.027  0.028  0.027  0.027 
 (0.45)  (0.48)  (0.45)  (0.44) 
Post-transition Firm  0.079  0.080  0.079  0.076 
 (1.67)  (1.69)  (1.67)  (1.55) 
Small Firm  -0.085*  -0.084*  -0.086  -0.085* 
 (1.87)  (1.85)  (1.68)  (1.85) 
Privatized Firm  0.045  0.045  0.046  0.046 
 (0.75)  (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.75) 
State-owned Firm  0.157**  0.160**  0.157**  0.156** 
 (2.36)  (2.42)  (2.37)  (2.31) 
Transparency 0.047  0.063**  0.047  0.047 
 (1.67)  (2.07)  (1.69)  (1.66) 
Per Capita GDP (Log)  0.154**  0.156**  0.154**  0.163* 
 (2.09)  (2.10)  (2.09)  (2.00) 
Inflation -0.284***  -0.283***  -0.284***  -0.291*** 
 (3.69)  (3.62)  (3.70)  (3.83) 
Foreign Bank Assets  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.007** 
 (2.75)  (2.71)  (2.75)  (2.67) 
Creditor Rights  0.054  0.053  0.054  0.040 
 (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.78)  (0.47) 
Time to Enforce Payment (Log)  -0.403***  -0.408***  -0.403***  -0.412*** 
 (3.71)  (3.71)  (3.71)  (3.64) 
Information Sharing × Opaque Firm   0.036     
   (1.61)     
Information Sharing × Small Firm     -0.001   
     (0.03)   
Information Sharing × Weak Creditor Rights       -0.029 
       (0.62) 
Constant 3.786***  3.799***  3.786***  3.876*** 
 (4.74)  (4.70)  (4.76)  (4.58) 
        
Observations 5450  5450  5450  5450 
R-squared 0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
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Table 7. Firm Debt 
 
The table reports Tobit regression estimates for the ratio of total debt to total assets (expressed in 
percentage values). Each regression includes sector dummies. Opaque Firm is a dummy variable 
which is 1 only for firms that do not have external auditors or international accounting standards. 
Weak Creditor Rights is a dummy variable which is 1 only for firms in countries where the value of 
the Creditor Right Index is less than or equal to 2. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. One star indicates that the 
estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 
1%. 
 
 
  (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Information  Sharing  1.062  1.071 0.615 -1.292 
  (0.92)  (1.00) (0.52) (1.11) 
Transition  Firm  1.110  1.109 1.009 1.141 
  (0.50)  (0.51) (0.46) (0.53) 
Post-transition  Firm  0.586  0.585 0.433 1.039 
  (0.27)  (0.27) (0.21) (0.48) 
Small  Firm  -8.542***  -8.543*** -7.360*** -8.485*** 
  (5.04)  (5.04) (3.98) (5.17) 
Privatized  Firm  4.433**  4.433** 4.352** 4.347** 
  (2.45)  (2.45) (2.41) (2.53) 
State-owned  Firm  3.881***  3.879*** 3.934*** 4.113*** 
  (2.90)  (3.01) (2.95) (2.99) 
Transparency 3.675***  3.662**  3.733***  3.743*** 
  (2.58)  (2.42) (2.61) (2.72) 
Per Capita GDP (Log)  1.586  1.585  1.604  0.283 
  (0.97)  (0.97) (0.98) (0.18) 
Inflation  5.970*  5.968* 5.985* 7.215** 
  (1.79)  (1.80) (1.80) (2.18) 
Foreign  Bank  Assets  0.117**  0.117** 0.116** 0.160*** 
  (2.03)  (2.04) (2.00) (2.70) 
Creditor  Rights  5.276***  5.277*** 5.306*** 7.511*** 
  (2.86)  (2.86) (2.87) (3.62) 
Time to Enforce Payment (Log)  4.235  4.239  4.267  5.655** 
  (1.31)  (1.30) (1.32) (2.12) 
Information Sharing × Opaque Firm   -0.029     
   (0.02)     
Information Sharing × Small Firm     1.294*   
     (1.72)   
Information Sharing × Weak Creditor Rights      4.317*** 
      ( 3 . 0 9 )  
Constant  -59.712***  -59.716*** -60.551*** -74.515*** 
  (2.75)  (2.74) (2.80) (3.71) 
       
Observations  5717  5717 5717 5717 
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Table 8. Fixed Effects Panel Estimates: Access to Finance 
 
The table reports OLS estimates with firm-level fixed effects using the panel component of the 2002 
and 2005 BEEPS. The dependent variable is Access to Finance, defined as the answer to the question: 
“How problematic is access to finance for the operation and growth of your business?” (1=major 
obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Opaque Firm is a dummy variable 
which is 1 only for firms that do not have external auditors or international accounting standards. 
Weak Creditor Rights is a dummy variable which is 1 only for firms in countries where the value of 
the Creditor Right Index is less than or equal to 2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. One star 
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 
5%; three stars at 1%. 
 
 
   (1) 
 
 (2)   (3)   (4) 
Information Sharing  0.127***  0.124**  0.120*  -0.001 
  (2.72)  (2.40) (1.89) (0.01) 
Small  Firm  0.214  0.213 0.215 0.204 
  (1.52)  (1.51) (1.52) (1.45) 
Transparency  0.049  0.048 0.049 0.052 
  (0.92)  (0.90) (0.92) (0.98) 
Per Capita GDP (Log)  -0.071  -0.067  -0.068  -0.059 
  (0.22)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) 
Inflation  -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.32)  (1.32) (1.32) (1.08) 
Foreign  Bank  Assets  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.28)  (0.27) (0.28) (0.47) 
Creditor  Rights  0.508***  0.509*** 0.508*** 0.441** 
  (2.92)  (2.92) (2.92) (2.47) 
Information Sharing × Opaque Firm   0.013     
   (0.16)     
Information Sharing × Small Firm     0.013   
     (0.18)   
Information Sharing × Weak Creditor Rights      0.154* 
      ( 1 . 6 1 )  
Constant  0.029  0.027 0.027 0.035 
  (0.18)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) 
Observations  2416  2416 2416 2416 
R-squared  0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 
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Table 9. Fixed Effects Panel Estimates: Cost of Finance 
 
The table reports regression estimates with firm-level fixed effects using the panel component of the 
2002 and 2005 BEEPS. The dependent variable is Cost of Finance, defined as the answer to the 
question: “How problematic is cost of financing (e.g. interest rates and charges) for the operation and 
growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). 
Opaque Firm is a dummy variable which is 1 only for firms that do not have external auditors or 
international accounting standards. Weak Creditor Rights is a dummy variable which is 1 only for 
firms in countries where the value of the Creditor Right Index is less than or equal to 2. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. One star indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from 
zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 
   (1) 
 
 (2)   (3)   (4) 
Information Sharing  0.120***  0.123**  0.099  -0.089 
  (2.65) (2.43) (1.58) (0.99) 
Small  Firm  0.172 0.172 0.175 0.154 
  (1.27) (1.27) (1.29) (1.13) 
Transparency  0.072 0.072 0.073 0.077 
  (1.39) (1.39) (1.40) (1.50) 
Per Capita GDP (Log)  -0.196  -0.199  -0.187  -0.170 
  (0.62) (0.62) (0.59) (0.54) 
Inflation  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
  (3.21) (3.21) (3.21) (2.80) 
Foreign  Bank  Assets  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.83) (0.83) (0.84) (1.08) 
Creditor  Rights  0.223 0.222 0.224 0.113 
  (1.30) (1.30) (1.31) (0.64) 
Information Sharing × Opaque Firm   -0.009    
   (0.12)    
Information Sharing × Small Firm    0.035   
     (0.50)   
Information Sharing × Weak Creditor Rights     0.251*** 
     ( 2 . 6 9 )  
Constant  -0.016 -0.015 -0.021 -0.009 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) 
      
Observations  2416 2416 2416 2416 
R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
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